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s the title indicates, this article is
about the role of the US Navy in
the early history of the Military
Operations Research Society (MORS). To
understand why the Navy played a central
role in the creation of MORS, it is necessary
to go back to the beginning of military
operations research (OR) itself.
OR had its origins in the study of mili-
tary operations. It began when, having de-
veloped radar, British scientists were then
asked to develop procedures for its use in
an air defense system. This was research
focused on operations and was a funda-
mentally new employment of the scientific
method by scientific personnel.
THE BEGINNING
The Operational Research Society in
the United Kingdom says that operational
research as an organized activity dates
from 1937 (the British say ‘‘operational’’
and we say ‘‘operations’’). The date is re-
lated to the development of radar. The the-
ory of radar was largely known since the
days of Maxwell and Hertz in the late
19th century. In the UK, a simple demon-
stration in February 1935 using a BBC
shortwave signal showed that aircraft re-
flected radio signals. In December 1935, a
five-station system of early warning radar
stations code-named Chain Home was au-
thorized. Trials conducted in September
1936 indicated equipment problems in the
prototype system. The problems were re-
solved by April 1937, and by the summer
of 1937 an expanded network of 20 Chain
Home stations was in check-out opera-
tions. RobertWatson-Watt led the team that
developed radar at the National Physical
Laboratory.
The beginning of operational research
is described by physicist E. C. Williams:
‘‘I was a junior scientific officer at the Bawd-
sey Research Station in the Air Ministry.
This was the research establishment engaged
in the development of what is now called ra-
dar. Towards the end of 1937 I had just fin-
ished a series of experiments in jamming
our own radars so that we could be prepared
for enemy jamming if it happened—as indeed
it did. I was then assigned to join a team to
find out how best to use the radars in what
we would now call the ‘‘total system’’ for
intercepting and destroying enemy aircraft.
I and others in the team came under the direc-
tion of Harold Larnder.
‘‘Now we had to have a name to describe us and
what we were doing. The rest of the establish-
ment was engaged on the normal work of re-
search and development and design of radar
equipments. We were beginning to find out
how best to use them. The term ‘‘operations’’
has a specific connotation in the Armed Ser-
vices, and we were now beginning to be con-
cerned with operations. So, one or other or
both (and I cannot remember which) of Sir
Robert Watson-Watt and A. P. Rowe coined
the term ‘‘operational research section’’ to put
on the organization chart over our names sim-
ply to distinguish this new kind of work from
the normal work of a research and development
establishment’’ (Williams, 1967).
Early 1938 attempts to use Chain Home
to direct RAF fighters to intercept airliners
did not go well but during the Home De-
fense exercises in mid-1938 its usefulness
was proven. Chain Home was the world’s
first integrated air defense system and
ground controllers successfully directed in-
terceptors to targets 75 percent of the time,
day or night. Chain Home was capable of
aircraft detections at ranges up to 100 miles.
Chain Home required intense human
interaction both to direction-find on each
target and to filter reports from many radar
stations into a coherent air picture. Chain
Home stations were connected by tele-
phone and able to exchange information
and data as well as pass it on to the Filter
Room at Fighter Command. The Chain
Home system gave Fighter Command 20
minutes to put fighter squadrons in the air,
vector them toward the inbound hostile air-
craft, and to dynamically assign squadrons
as needed. It allowed the RAF to use its
fighters far more effectively.
Chain Home was based on radar detec-
tion of aircraft. Although most of the major
combatants discovered radar at almost the
same time, the Britishwere leaders in realiz-
ing its potential and by the outbreak of war
Britain had a fully operational air defense
system based on radar. (This information
is available from various sources, including
several Wikipedia postings on the subject
‘‘Chain Home.’’)
The Battle of Britain lasted from July
1940 to the end of October of that year.
Hitler’s Fuhrer Directive of 16 July 1940,
‘‘Preparations for a landing operation against
England’’ (Operation Sealion), tasked the
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Luftwaffe to destroy the Royal Air Force
(RAF) (Keegan, 1990, pp. 88–102). This did not
happen, and on 17 September 1940, Hitler an-
nounced the postponement of Sealion. Attention
was then turned to bombing London to destroy
the will of the British people to continue fighting.
This did not happen either and Nazi Germany
suffered its first defeat. ‘‘Chain Home strongly
swung the balance of air power in the direction
of defense’’ (wikipedia.org/wiki/Chain_Home),
and the smaller RAF prevailed.
At the height of the Battle of Britain, Prime
Minister Winston Churchill wrote, ‘‘It is by de-
vising new weapons, and above all by scientific
leadership, that we shall best cope with the
enemy’s superior strength’’ (Churchill, 1940, p. 3,
paragraph 7). All of the main operational com-
mands of the British armed forces subsequently
established operational research sections (Miser,
2000, p. 101).
WARTIME DEVELOPMENTS IN THE
UNITED STATES
British developments in operational re-
search were watched in the United States by
both the Navy and the Army. In a letter dated
January 27, 1942, at the start of the German
U-boat campaign in the Atlantic, Navy Captain
Robert Carney (later Chief of Naval Operations
(CNO) 1953–1955) recommended that an anti-
submarine warfare group be established within
the Atlantic Fleet (Ladislas, 1962, p. 141). The
Antisubmarine Warfare Unit of the Atlantic
Fleet was established on March 2, 1942, becom-
ing the first formal OR organization in this
country (Engel, 1960, p. 799). A month later,
with Philip Morse from MIT and six other civil-
ian scientists on board, the Unit took the name
Antisubmarine Warfare Operations Research
Group (ASWORG). Things were moving very
fast because the situation was quite serious. In
a letter to the CNO, Chief of Staff of the Army
General George C. Marshall wrote, ‘‘The losses
by submarines off our Atlantic seaboard and
in the Caribbean now threaten our entire war
effort’’ (Goralski and Freeburg, 1987, p. 103).
ASWORG developed tactics used in search-
ing for submarines, devised plans for escorting
convoys of ships, and contributed significantly
to the ebb and flow of measures and counter-
measures in the Battle of the Atlantic. With the
decline of the submarine threat, ASWORG was
renamed the Operations Research Group in Oc-
tober 1944, after expanding its studies to include
strategic mining, anti-air warfare, and other
areas of naval warfare.
The Navy considered the use of OR in
World War II to have been quite valuable. In
his final report to the Secretary of the Navy on
the US Navy in World War II, the CNO, Fleet
Admiral Ernest King, wrote that OR ‘‘made it
possible to work out improvements in tactics
which sometimes increased the effectiveness
of weapons by factors of three or five.’’ (King,
1946, p. 173–175). Admiral King also noted that
the Operations Research Group would be
renamed the Operations Evaluation Group
(OEG) as more closely descriptive of its func-
tions, and that he was taking action to insure
its uninterrupted continuation into peacetime
(King, 1945).
POSTWAR NAVY OR AND MORS
In addition to the OEG in Washington, the
Navy laboratories started OR groups early in
the postwar period. These included the Naval
Ordnance Laboratory (NOL) in Corona, Califor-
nia; the Naval Ordnance Test Station (NOTS) in
China Lake, California; the Naval Electronics
Laboratory (NEL) in San Diego, California; the
Pacific Missile Range (PMR) at Point Mugu,
California; the Navy Missile Center (NMC) at
Point Mugu, California; the NOL in White
Oak, Maryland, and others. Glover Colladay
and Carl Schaniel were involved in military
OR at NOTS, as well as Miles Sheehy at NEL,
Lewis Leake at PMR (who was later the found-
ing president of MORS), Frederick Lund at
NMC, and Robert Miller at NOLWhite Oak, to
name a few of the individuals involved.
Those involved undoubtedly knew each
other and, as needed, exchanged visits and dis-
cussions of the work they were doing. However,
a forum for all those doing military OR did
not exist. The Operations Research Society of
America (ORSA) was founded in 1952 and the
Institute of Management Science (TIMS) was
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founded in 1953. Neither organization could
deal with classified discussions, nor did they
want to do so. It was estimated that two-thirds
of the military operations researchers did not
identify with an OR society, nor did they submit
their work to the appropriate journals andmeet-
ings for review (Yovitz and Chase, 1963).
James Garvey was a scientific officer at the
Office of Naval Research (ONR) branch in Pasa-
dena, California, participated in discussions in
1956–1957 that led to the first military OR sym-
posium, and was the chairman of the sixth
through 10th symposia. He wrote of the histor-
ical development of MORS:
‘‘In the period 1953–1956 various efforts were made
to bring to fruition something of the nature of
MORS. These did not succeed with the reasons be-
ing intimately related to the difficulties of operating
a classified symposium to the satisfaction of the en-
tire defense community. The group of scientists who
gathered at the ONR branch office in Pasadena for
a series of meetings in 1956–1957 did succeed. The
reasons for this were, in part, that there was a rising
acceptance of the concept of the usefulness of a joint-
service symposium in military operations research
and the fact that the sponsor was a responsible office
of a nationally recognized government agency, ac-
tively engaged in the support of scientific research
within the defense community. It was also probably
helpful that this attempt, though joint-service in
spirit, was primarily single-service (Navy) in its
original composition. That is, the Navy-oriented
structure was able to initiate activity which might
not have been feasible if a rigid framework of true
joint-service action was insisted upon from the
beginning.
‘‘The essence of the policy framework established in
the discussions of the variant participants in the
early meetings of the planning committees were
these: (1) MORS was to be understood as a comple-
ment, not a competitor to such organizations as
ORSAa; (2) Thus, specifically, MORS should try
to provide a forum for the presentation of classified
military operations research; (3) MORS was to be
understood as a joint-service symposia despite the
obvious bias which would characterize it at first
due to the predominantly Navy-related military
operations research community on the west coast’’
(Garvey, 1982, p. 6).
The first symposiumwas held at theNOL in
Corona, California, in August 1957. MORS was
not an organized association of military OR
analysts. The ‘‘S’’ in MORS at that time stood
for ‘‘symposia’’ rather than ‘‘society.’’ The early
symposia were planned and operated by a steer-
ing committee, an informal group of volunteers
whowere active at theWest Coast Navy laborato-
ries.Nine of the first 10 symposiawere held on the
West Coast though the desire to be joint service
and nationally focused was always present.
Garvey included a detailed account of the
first 10 MORS (Garvey, 1982). Therefore, only
a few of the structural features of these early
symposia are mentioned here. Working groups
were added to the symposia structure with the
sixth symposium in October 1960, the year in
which two symposia per year became the norm.
The eighth symposium brought the first publi-
cation of the classified Proceedings of MORS.
Garvey says the definitive change in com-
position from western to national and joint ser-
vice focus occurred with the eighth MORS and
was confirmed by the ninth and 10th symposia.
With the growth of MORS to recognized na-
tional stature as a significant mode of expres-
sion of the entire military OR community,
sponsorship was transferred to ONR Head-
quarters in Washington, DC. Beginning with
the 11th symposium, ONR Washington as-
sumed sponsorship and supervision of the
symposia and hired a contractor to perform the
work in cooperation with a volunteer executive
committee. The contractor was Commander
Vance Wanner, USN (Ret.), who operated MORS
fromhis apartment in Alexandria, Virginia. This
arrangement was not seen as entirely satisfac-
tory and in April 1966, the Military Operations
Research Society was incorporated under the
laws of the Commonwealth of Virginia.b The
Navy was the sole sponsor of MORS until
the Army and Air Force also became sponsors
beginning with the 21st symposium (1968).c
For completeness it is noted that in 1951 the
Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) began a grad-
uate degree program in OR.
“The program was directed by the CNO, Admiral
Forrest Sherman, in 1950 as an item on a list of ac-
tions stemming from World War II operations. The
superintendent of NPS, Admiral E. E. Herrmann,
was instructed to set up a one-year curriculum in
OR at an appropriate civilian institution. Admiral
Herrmann found no interest from the schools he que-
ried. In December 1950, he and the director of the
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OEG, Dr. Jacinto Steinhardt, submitted a joint pro-
posal to establish a six-term degree curriculum at
NPS. Steinhardt, who had joined ASWORG in
1942, helped design the initial curriculum.
After considerable discussion, the Chief of Naval Per-
sonnel approved the proposal with the stipulation that
the curriculum might require change if it proved to be
too difficult for naval officers who had not specialized
in higher mathematics’’ (Story, 1968, pp. 67–68).
The first class of nine officers began their
studies in August 1951 and graduated in Janu-
ary 1953. The curriculum was the first graduate
degree program in OR anywhere (Schrady, 2001).
NPS is included here as part of the naval heritage
of MORS because of its faculty and military of-
ficer graduates’ contributions to the operations
of MORS and its symposia. Additionally, NPS
has hosted a dozen military operations research
symposia starting with the fourth MORS in
September 1959.
Heritage is defined as something transmit-
ted or acquired from a predecessor. MORS does
indeed have US Navy heritage.
NOTES
a ORSA and TIMS merged in 1995 to form
INFORMS, the Institute for Operations Re-
search and the Management Sciences.
b MORS was the acronym for Military Op-
erations Research Symposium until incorpo-
ration. After incorporation, MORS was the
acronym for both Military Operations Research
Symposium and Military Operations Research
Society and the reader was supposed to deal
with the ambiguity based on the context in
which the acronym was used. Dick Wiles, who
served as executive director of MORS from
1984 to 2000, unilaterally resolved the ambigu-
ity by introducing MORSS as the acronym for
the MORS symposia in 1984.
c This information came from examination
of the Proceedings of MORS archived in the classi-
fied material section of the Naval Postgraduate
School Library.
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